

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Why Be Critical?

Slavko Splichal

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Kardeljeva pl. 5, Slovenia

doi:10.1111/j.1753-9137.2007.00003.x

Almost 60 years ago, Lasswell (1949) asked, “Why be quantitative?” and vigorously argued that “the study of politics can be advanced by the quantitative analysis of political discourse ... [b]ecause of the scientific and policy gains that can come of it” (pp. 40, 52). He suggested that severe “limitations of qualitative analysis,” such as imprecision and arbitrariness, could be overcome by quantification. A decade later, Lazarsfeld (1957, p. 41) pleaded for a more balanced view, suggesting that empirical research cannot only provide “sharper conceptual tools” that would bring to light “new implications of all sorts” (usually championed by representatives of the empirical paradigm; Noelle-Neumann, 1979, p. 144) but also that “the very act of inspecting this classical material brings to our attention ideas which might otherwise have been overlooked” in the process of empirical research. He concluded that “[t]heorizing itself can make progress, and the logic of empirical research can contribute to it.”

Ironically, perhaps, I would offer a similar answer to “why be *critical*”: because critical theory and research can provide higher scientific and policy gains than “conventional research” to use Halloran’s term. The role of critical theory cannot be reduced to that of describing and explaining empirical reality, and it has to question existing conditions in terms of their historical preconditions and future possibilities. It cannot live with what is or was empirically existing, prevalent or “normal,” or “anomalous” in a given period of time and historical context; it has to permanently broaden the horizons of what is *relevant* today and *possible* in the future, identify the seeds of what may stimulate social transformation, and trace its directions.

Similar to Gramsci’s idea of “integral journalism,” critical research (including theory) should be considered “integral research” in the sense that it seeks not only to satisfy some given (existing) needs but also to create and develop those needs, to progressively enlarge the population of its users, and to raise civic consciousness. It is inseparably connected to politics (and thus, often both opposed *to* and *by* politics) because it is focused on contradictions and conflicts in contemporary societies, which are often rooted in the alienating conditions of individuals and social groups. Such an integral form of critical communication research is emancipatory because it strives to explain how the historical processes of alienation and subordination are reproduced (in constantly changing patterns); more specifically, how they penetrate

Corresponding author: Slavko Splichal, e-mail: slavko.splichal@guest.arnes.si

communication processes in different spheres of human life (e.g., education, organizational communication, interpersonal communication, journalism, mass communication, or computer-mediated communication), and how those processes could be overturned.

Because any empirical research unavoidably proceeds from certain normative assumptions (even if not explicit), critical theory also has to guide empirical research—and thus be normative, as Lazarsfeld already suggested. Social criticism in theory and research is not adverse to empirical research, including quantitative research methods. According to Habermas (2006, p. 412), normative theory can build a bridge to political reality and serve as a guide to empirical research projects. The idea of combining normative critical theory and empirical research may seem peculiar. However, Fishkin (2000, pp. 21–22) argues effectively that “most social science experiments are aimed at creating a counterfactual—the effect of the treatment condition. In this effort to fuse normative and empirical research agendas, the trick is to identify a treatment condition that embodies the appropriate normative relevance.”

What we cannot observe, we cannot (help) change; we can only interpret it—to modify the famed Marx’s Thesis Eleven.

Finally, a central element of a critical theory is its self-reflexivity: It always includes an account of itself and of its own historical preconditions and assumptions. It is not only the processes of communication and their social contexts that should be scrutinized critically but also the practice and politics of communication research itself.

Questioning “conventional” research

Following Lasswell’s criticism of qualitative analysis, I will start with a brief explication of my critical stance toward “conventional communication research” (Halloran) or the “dominant paradigm” (Gitlin), criticizing and being criticized by “qualitative approaches” and “critical theory.”

Since Lasswell’s time, quantification has gained momentum in the social sciences. Communication and media studies were not exempted. By its methodology, communication and media research largely concentrated on narrowly defined, “specific, measurable, short-term, individual, attitudinal, and behavioral ‘effects’ of media content” because they were “measurable in a strict, replicable behavioral sense, thereby deflecting attention from larger social meanings of mass media production” (Gitlin, 1978, pp. 206–207). “Scientific” became synonymous with “quantitative” or more broadly speaking, with “value free, positivistic, empiricist, behaviouristic, psychological emphasis” in research; there was “little or no attention given to theory, concepts or the nature of the relevant substantive issues and their relationship to wider societal concerns” (Halloran, 1981, p. 3). Theorizing has been largely replaced by “hypotheses testing,” and “statistical significance” has become absolute evidence of research validity (and scientific truth) regardless of whether

a reasonable (theory-based) argument was provided or not. Quantifiable “observables”—such as individuals as research units in surveys and operationally defined variables—have become mainstays of “deliverables”—objects produced as a result of executing research projects and delivered to those providing research money.

To be clear, my criticism does not imply a negation of the validity of quantitative methods in empirical research, even less so empirical research altogether. On the contrary, empirical research may be a powerful tool of social criticism, as indicated, for example, by Engels' *Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England* (1845). Empirical research (particularly some public opinion surveys) in the former socialist countries—although rarely allowed by the authorities—was an important critical impulse against the ideologized consciousness of the ruling political elites by investigating differences in interests and social contradictions in the development of socialism.

Neither qualitative nor quantitative methods alone determine the nature of research. Halloran's (1981) observation that “a true understanding of the nature of the research and its application, calls for an understanding of the historical, economic, political, organizational, professional, and personal factors which impinge on the research process in so many ways,” (p. 1) makes this point. It may well be that “the research methods used are commonly thought to be the basis for distinguishing” between administrative and critical research, in addition to the problems selected and the ideological orientation of researchers, as Smythe and van Dinh (1983, p. 117) suggest. Yet, common sense differs from a true understanding of differences. I certainly believe that the terms “qualitative analysis” and “quantitative analysis” do not refer to radically different approaches, as one of the early critics of a one-sided reliance on quantitative analysis has warned, arguing that “the two approaches actually overlap, and have in fact complemented and interpenetrated each other in several investigations” (Kracauer, 1952–1953, p. 637).

The problem of “being scientific” by using quantitative methods does not rest in the methods themselves, but rather, in the *belief* that the use of quantitative methods alone provides the “scientificity” (objectivity, validity, and reliability) of research and “unfeters” it from all contextual factors that, *in fact*, influence not only the research methods and processes but also, and primarily, the selection of research questions in both empirical research and theory, and the ways in which they are asked or “disqualified.” Communication research is hardly unique in its quandary over how to rationalize the selection of issues to be investigated and questions to be asked.

A series of empirical gate-keeping studies demonstrate that the selection of news is far from being random but based on specific (“news”) values and interests. What is even more important, however, is, as Gouldner (1976, p. 107) argues, that news not only “reports” but also “censors and occludes aspects of life; its silences generate a kind of ‘underprivileged’ social reality, a social reality implicitly said (by the silence) to be unworthy of attention.”

The selection process of questions in polls and surveys is similar. Bourdieu (1972/1979) criticized “the imposition of problematics” in public opinion polling in the

sense that they are always “subordinated to a specific kind of demand,” and the key question remains, “who can afford to pay for an opinion poll” (p. 124). Media reporting and polling questions not only attract and frame the attention of audiences or respondents but also avert their attention from certain issues.

Similarly, we are faced with the problem of “censoring” certain aspects of life while defining research questions. In other words, which research questions we ask and which theoretical issues we discuss is affected by a number of factors such as those identified by Bourdieu and Halloran. Their commonality is the relation to *values, ideologies, and politics*.

Any type and any paradigm of social communication research trespasses on the territory of politics. The closer research comes to issues of interest to powerful political and economic actors or in which they are actively involved, the greater is the likelihood that research decisions are influenced by nonpertinent or biased assumptions and interests. Thus, the intensity of such interests and involvements is proportionate to (a) the scientific audaciousness of questioning the most “sacrosanct”—national, political, and ideological—interests or values and (b) the relevance of research and its implications for the policies of those actors.

Even if compared to the most radical or even revolutionary critical theories (in terms of existing knowledge or prevailing politics), applied research is much more confronted by *institutional constraints* and temptations to yield to conditions defined by funding institutions. That is why *it seems* that any empirical and particularly quantitative research, by necessity, reduces the level of criticism theory can provide. Adorno’s experience with empirical research in the Princeton Radio Project during the late 1930s indicates such constraints in the United States:

Naturally there appeared to be little room for [critical] social research in the framework of the Princeton Project. Its charter, which came from the Rockefeller Foundation, expressly stipulated that the investigations must be performed within the limits of the commercial radio system prevailing in the United States. It was thereby implied that the system itself, its cultural and sociological consequences, and its social and economic presuppositions were not to be analyzed. (Adorno, 1969, p. 343)

My own experience with institutional constraints put upon critical, theoretical, and empirical research in socialism corroborates Adorno’s criticism. Asking bothersome questions in social surveys about the social system could have had fatal consequences for the researcher. In contrast to the situation in democratic capitalist countries, even critically questioning any Marxist theorem had the same consequences. Quite obviously, these restraints have not been brought about because of some innate methodological constraint, but rather, because of various forms of social, cultural, and political domination. Since the 1930s, they stimulated the development of the “dominant paradigm” of empirical-behavioral communication theory and research in the United States and other Western countries with three distinctive but interwoven dimensions (Hall, 1989):

1. The epistemological and theoretical weakness of the paradigm, which is primarily reflected in its inclination toward “the naturalism of an entrenched individualism” and, thus, a simplified conceptualization of communication phenomena.
2. The pressures toward an administrative institutionalization of communication as a self-sustaining disciplinary specialty.
3. The theoretical efforts to constitute communication as a self-sustaining phenomenon separate from its broader social, political, economic, cultural, and political contexts, which would justify communication as an “independent discipline.”

An almost “perfect” example of how this empirical–behavioral tradition in communication theory and research conquered the dominant paradigm position, and stimulated self-sufficiency and fragmentation of the discipline, is the dispute on the epistemological status of *Publizistikwissenschaft* in Germany in the 1960s. It was partly related but not a reflection of a more general *Positivismusstreit* of critical theory against positivism. Both struggles revealed the declining (institutional) power of critical, ethically grounded research in Germany under the influence of behavioral social sciences. The new U.S.-originated “scientific” tradition in communication research prevailed in Germany largely, though not exclusively, because it was believed to provide *Publizistikwissenschaft* with the legitimacy (or “political correctness”) it had lost under National Socialism (Hardt, 2002, p. 34). An important reason was the fear that it would lose the status of an independent scientific discipline. At the end of the process, *Publizistikwissenschaft* was institutionally transferred from its traditional resort in the humanities (faculties of philosophy) to newly established faculties of social sciences (Löblich, 2007).

Social criticism and the norm of publicity

I should briefly illustrate the importance of being critical with the *norm* of critical publicity as *the* fundamental and organizing principle of the public sphere. The normative dimension implies a *critical look* at intellectual and material *history* of publicity. This is particularly important because the present fascination with new information and communication technologies (ICT) may easily veil their deep embeddedness in the social structure and their ambivalent potential in relation to social visibility and publicity. It is important to realize that citizens will remain deprived of opportunities to make democratic decisions without an enhanced capacity to gain access to information and to communication media. Yet, the capacity to acquire needed information is largely a question of human capabilities, economic conditions, and social values embedded in regulations and laws beyond technology. The capacity of citizens to communicate with each other is largely a question of appropriate media but also of education and development of virtual or physical public spaces. The technical capacity of ICT has not totally transformed and devalued the importance of our generic ability and need to communicate, central to which is the capacity to communicate face to face.

An emphasis on the normative dimension in conceptualizing the public sphere whose organizing principle is that of publicity may help us avoid an operational (or empiricist) reduction to existing social conditions. Yet, the prevention of normative blindness may also easily lead to normative sterility. A normative approach is productive inasmuch as it links normative presuppositions and empirical social conditions in a historical perspective, thus linking the present with the past and the future. The results of a historical inquiry have to be tested—in terms of theory and practice—against the existing reality from the point of view of its hypothetical future development and alternatives in the past. This may help us see what *could* have happened and what *can* happen due to specific circumstances. As Kant suggests in his defense of the Platonian Republic, we should carefully follow up on the ideas of the past, even if past thinkers “left us without assistance” and “employ new efforts to place them in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling them aside as useless” (Kant, 1781, p. 125).

The concept of publicity that represents the very heart of the concept of the public sphere is, in its strict sense, a product of the Enlightenment, and since its first appearances, it had a clearly *critical* sting—it was directed against the social and political structures of the traditional, premodern, or prebourgeois society and hereditary authoritarian power. The principle of publicity was originally conceived of as a critical impulse against injustice, based on the secrecy of state actions and as an enlightening momentum, substantiating the “region of human liberty,” making private citizens equal in the public use of reason. In contrast to earlier and vague conceptualizations of “public opinion,” the concept of *critique* was central to the idea of publicity at that period as it was to the ideas of Enlightenment, in general. Bentham (1791/1994) argued for a free press as an instrument for public control of government, in the interest of general happiness—in contrast to what the dominant function of the press had been at that time. Kant (1784) advocated free public discussion as a means of citizens to develop and express their autonomous rationality—in contrast to the existing censorship at that time.

Yet later, particularly in the 20th century, this critical dimension was waning again, as for example with the concept of “public relations” and the empirical concept of “public opinion” (as “measured” in polls). A reconceptualization of publicity is clearly reflected in the fact that the very word “publicity,” which used to refer to reasoned *debates*, has been overshadowed by “the activity of making certain that someone or something attracts a lot of interest or attention from many people” (as defined in *Cambridge International Dictionary of English*) or by “a type of public relations in the form of a news item or story which conveys information about a product, service, or idea in the media,” as advertisers conceive of it.

Another positivist stream of “public sphere” research is focused on the rapidly growing computer-mediated communication of the Internet in the 1990s. The Internet was (to some degree still is) believed to radically challenge the hierarchical, top-down mass communication model typical of traditional media and democratize not only communication but also political relations in general, irrespective of all other

(former) impediments. It was (is) thought to offer new possibilities for political participation, leading to a kind of direct democracy, not only locally but also even at the (trans-)national level: A genuine or “strong” electronic democracy was expected to oust populist democracy, dominated by traditional mass media, particularly television. Although there is no doubt that new types of engagement are made possible by new communication technologies and established communication infrastructures (in developed societies), it is much more questionable if they stimulate and revive political participation and civic engagement.

Indeed, new forms of communication and network (“virtual”) communities established with its assistance may not only help revitalize democracy but could also entice us into an attractively packaged surrogate for a democratically organized public sphere—the (hi)story is well known from the past, when the press and other “big” media, conceived as the pillars of democracy, had largely lost their democratic responsibilities. Cyber citizenship did not solve the problems of democratic political representation and (even less) participation. It is true that a large number of Web communities were formed, both locally (nationally) and globally, which are based on common interests and often imply a certain level of solidarity among participants. Yet, the Web communities do not significantly enhance democracy, because they are just as narrowly defined as traditional public factions, defined by racial, gender, age, ideological, or religious identities and interests. The democratic merit of computer-mediated communication is mostly limited to the successful overturn of political suppression and censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to control and repress (mass) communication and public opinion. In some cases, they may have contributed to the transgression of fragmented cultural and political interests, but they also may have deepened dissociation and fragmentation. The boom of millions of more or less specialized chat rooms and blogs across the world do not lead to an inter- or supra-national public sphere, but rather to the fragmentation of mass audiences—who are large, dispersed, and predominantly national, but nevertheless, focused on political issues defined by the media—into a huge number of dissociated “issue publics.”

Mills’ operational model opposing the mass and the public is an example of the attempts to narrow the gap between normative critical and empirical approaches by specifying the empirical conditions that should take place to facilitate deliberative legitimization processes in complex societies by mediated political communication in the public sphere. It turns out that new communication technologies can help “solve” less than one half of the problem. They make possible (a) “virtually as many people express opinion as receive them” and (b) “Public communications are so organized that there is a chance immediately ... to answer back any opinion expressed in public.” Immediately perhaps, but not also *effectively* (who will visit your reply on the Web site?), which was the second part of Mills’ claim. In contrast, new technologies have no significant impact on two subsequent dimensions, differentiating between the mass and the public, namely (c) whether an opinion formed in discussion could be materialized in an effective action, even against authorities, or the realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities and (d) whether the public is autonomous in

its operations from authoritative institutions or whether they penetrate the formation of opinion (Mills, 1956/2000, pp. 303–304)—not in references.

Habermas' quest for the communication model of deliberative politics represents a similar attempt. The two specific conditions he defines are that (a) "a self-regulating media system gains independence from its social environments" and (b) "anonymous audiences grant feedback between an informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society" (Habermas, 2006, p. 412).

Theorizing and investigating the constantly changing *social* conditions, which substantially affect communication among human beings, are the primary task or "mission" of critical communication studies. This does not imply that such studies should produce claims related to ideal communication acts—supposedly good in themselves although opposed to reality—but related to what it is already time for, due to the existing practical conditions, to paraphrase Horkheimer's famous idea. Such attempts may be seen as "nonproductive"—because they do not advance the existence of the past in the present or the present in the future—yet they are productive in a more fundamental sense; they "construe" facts that materially do not yet exist, but have ample potential for existing, and they confront barriers that do not allow for their practical realization. In that sense, communication, like any other social research, always implies (maybe just tacitly assumes) normative and regulative components that link theory, research, and social action.

The empirical conditions specified by Mills and Habermas should remind us that attempts to regulate and institutionalize human communication (either to liberate or to censor it) are at least as old as those trying to understand and theorize its human nature and its inherent laws. Such a crucial "regulatory question," which critical communication research should concentrate on today, is that of unraveling communication (in)equalities among individuals and social groups and impediments to the civil right to communicate.

But regardless of how we assess the relationship between regulation and research and the social character of that relationship in different societies, cultures, and historical periods, we must realize that communication research has never been "regulation free." The results of social research may always invite, or be used for, "therapy" by social action. Whether "administrative research," as a prototype of linking specific problems and tools identified with interpretations of findings that support (explicitly or implicitly) the status quo of society, or critical theory and research, or any other theory—they are all motivated to create specific relations between theory and social practice and specifically, influence regulatory capacities and institutional designs. And *vice versa*: Regulatory and institutional designs always imply or proceed from more abstract ideas or theories rather than from sheer empirical investigations and analyses.

I do not think the identification of ideal communication procedures and social conditions for them to materialize in the empirical world is utopianism. I am suspicious of the so-called "end of utopia" because the end of utopia as a great achievement of (Western) civilization is predicated on the misidentification of utopia with

totalitarianism. It is often (wrongly) believed that utopias (similarly to ideologies) are necessarily a first step to totalitarianism because the use of force and violence would be justified to achieve utopia. Nevertheless, as Marcuse suggests in his discussion of the end of utopia, the projects of (radical) social transformation that are not viable because of the absence of subjective and objective factors at present should not be designated as “utopian” but rather as “provisionally unfeasible” projects. Strictly speaking, only those projects may be considered utopian that contradict “certain scientifically established laws, biological laws, physical laws; for example, such projects as the age-old idea of eternal youth or the idea of a return to an alleged golden age”—but even for some of them, their “ahistoricity” has a historical limit (Marcuse, 1967, p. 11).

Similarly, Dewey argues in *The Public and Its Problems* against the accusation that democracy and majority rule lead—by definition—to mediocrity. In contrast, Dewey (1927/1991) maintains that there is no way to identify the genuine intellectual potential of the general population and its capacity to act as “the public” as long as citizens have limited access to education and until “secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentation, and propaganda as well as sheer ignorance are replaced by inquiry and publicity” (p. 209). In other words, a valid conclusion cannot be made on the basis of existing conditions; the public could be perfectly competent provided that “the problem of the public”—“the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion”—is solved. What seems to be a complete utopia to Lippmann (1922/1998) at that time was clearly a “provisionally unfeasible” project to Dewey.

The very counterfactuality of critical publicity and the (rational) public sphere is thus potentially liberating if it is tested against the existing practice. “The question of whether, and to what extent, a public sphere dominated by mass media provides a realistic chance for the members of civil society, in their competition with the political and economic invaders’ media power, to bring about changes in the spectrum of values, topics, and reasons . . . , to open it up in an innovative way, and to screen it critically” is a question that “cannot be answered without considerable empirical research” (Habermas, 1992, p. 455, emphasis added).

Fishkin’s experiments with deliberative polls justify this kind of “utopianism.” They are an example of empirical research, which Halloran (1981) names “policy-oriented research” in contrast to “policy research.” The latter is essentially administrative because it “seeks to bring about the efficient execution of policy and thereby make the existing system more efficient.” Policy-oriented research, in contrast, is normative critical: It starts by questioning what is tacitly assumed in administrative research—the validity of the existing system—and goes on to identify, normatively and empirically, “alternatives with regard to both means and ends.”

Conclusions

What can we learn from these historical insights? We can accept the belief that “critical work . . . is not the opposite of administrative research” (Golding & Murdock, 1991,

p. 17) only as far as it relates to methodology and the process of research in the narrow sense (crafting research questions, collecting information, analyzing data, and sharing results). In this sense, we can speak of the unity of the (social) sciences.

Yet, critical research radically departs from administrative research in taking its social responsibility seriously, that is, in defining the relevance and validity of research questions particularly in terms of social practice. The sense of being critical is expressed in sharing responsibility for the future by identifying those critical (empirical) conditions, which stimulate or fetter humane and democratic developments, and recognizing their historical roots. In that sense, it is “policy oriented” or to put it simply, political.

The earlier civil right to vote has now been enhanced by the civil right to communicate, resulting here in the identification of sites, where changes should and may take place to foster human equality, justice, and fairness. The very idea of the right (and duty) of citizens to communicate evolves from 18th-century conceptualizations of the principle of publicity, recently empowered by radical changes in social circumstances, which paved its way to materialize. There are powerful interests in all societies *against* the insistence on this right although, at least in the developed countries, productivity, wealth, and national incomes have increased to the level that makes it provisionally feasible. The task of critical theory and research is to help remove theoretical misconceptions, practical-political reservations, and empirical obstacles that still impede the enactment of the universal right to communicate.

Acknowledgment

I am indebted to Hanno Hardt for his critical comments and suggestions.

References

- Adorno, T. W. (1969). Scientific experiences of a European scholar in America. In D. Fleming & B. Bailyn (Eds.), *The intellectual migration: Europe and America, 1930–3960*, (pp. 338–370). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bentham, J. (1994). Of publicity. *Public Culture*, 6, 581–595. (Original work published 1791)
- Bourdieu, P. (1979). Public opinion does not exist. In A. Mattelart & S. Siegelau (Eds.), *Communication and class struggle*. Vol. 1, Capitalism, imperialism (pp. 124–130). New York: International General. (Original work published 1972)
- Dewey, J. (1991). *The public and its problems*. Athens, OH: Swallow. (Original work published 1927)
- Fishkin, J. S. (2000). The “Filter”, the “Mirror” and the “Mob”: Reflections on deliberative democracy. Paper presented at the conference “Deliberating about Deliberative Democracy,” February 4-6, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX. Retrieved September 2, 2007, from http://www.svet.lu.se/links/Demokratiresurser/papers_deliberativ_demokrati/FilterMirrorMob.pdf

- Gitlin, T. (1978). Media sociology: The dominant paradigm. *Theory and Society*, 6, 205–253.
- Golding, P., & Murdock, G. (1991). Culture, communication and political economy. In J. Curran & M. Gurevitch (Eds.), *Mass media and society* (pp. 15–32). London, U.K.: Edward Arnold.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1976). *The dialectic of ideology and technology: The origins, grammar, and future of ideology*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Habermas, J. (1992). *Further Reflections on the Public Sphere*. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (pp. 421–461). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in media society: Does democracy still enjoy an epistemic dimension? The impact of normative theory on empirical research. *Communication Theory*, 16, 411–426.
- Hall, S. (1989). Ideology and communication theory. In B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B.J. O'Keefe, E. Wartella (Eds.), *Rethinking communication—Vol. 1: Paradigm issues* (pp. 40–52). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Halloran, J. D. (1981). The context of mass communication research. *International commission for the study of communication problems document no. 78*. Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved September 2, 2007, from <http://www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0003/000385/038579eb.pdf>
- Hardt, H. (2002). Am Vergessen scheitern. Essay zur historischen Identität der Publizistikwissenschaft, 1945–68. *Medien und Zeit*, 17(2–3): 34–39.
- Kant, I. (1781). *The critique of pure reason*. (J. M. D. Micklejohn, Trans.). Retrieved September 2, 2007, from <http://www.e-text.org/text/Kant%20Immanuel%20-%20The%20Critique%20of%20Pure%20Reason.pdf>
- Kant, I. (1784). *An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?* Retrieved September 2, 2007, from <http://www.totalb.com/~mikeg/phil/kant/enlightenment.html#1>
- Kracauer, S. (1952–1953). The challenge of qualitative content analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 16, 631–642.
- Lasswell, H. D. (1949). Why be quantitative? In H. D. Laswell, N. Leites, and associates (Eds.), *Language of politics: Studies in quantitative semantics* (pp. 40–54). New York: George W. Stewart.
- Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1957). Public opinion and the classical tradition. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21, 39–53.
- Lippmann, W. (1998). *Public opinion*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. (Original work published 1922)
- Löblich, M. (2007). German *Publizistikwissenschaft* and its shift from a humanistic to an empirical social scientific discipline. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Emil Dovifat and the *Publizistik* debate. *European Journal of Communication*, 22, 69–81.
- Marcuse, H. (1967). *Das Ende der Utopie und Das Problem der Gewalt*. Berlin: Verlag Peter von Maikowski.
- Mills, C. W. (2000). *The power elite*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1956)
- Noelle-Neumann, E. (1979). Public opinion and the classical tradition. A re-evaluation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 43, 143–156.
- Smythe, D., & van Dinh, T. (1983). On critical and administrative research: A new critical synthesis. *Journal of Communication*, 33(3), 117–127.